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Abstract—Biometric recognition in Automated Border Con-
trol (ABC) systems is performed in response to an increased
worldwide traffic, by automatically verifying the identity of
the passenger during border crossing. Currently, ABC systems
seldom use methods for multimodal biometric fusion, which
have been proved to increase the recognition accuracy, due to
technological and privacy limitations. This paper proposes a
framework for the biometric fusion in ABC systems, with the
features of being technology-neutral and privacy-compliant, by
performing an analysis of the most suitable biometric fusion
techniques for ABC systems and considering the current technical
and legal limitations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Automated Border Control (ABC) systems have emerged as
a satisfactory solution that can reduce the border crossing time
and the costs of border controls, while increasing throughput
and security, by exploiting biometric technologies for com-
paring a live biometric sample acquired during the border
crossing (fresh image) with the data stored in an electronic
document, like the e-Passport (stored image) [1]. In this way,
border guards can get discharged from tedious controls and
focus on different tasks [2].
An important problem of ABC systems is that the biometric
accuracy can be reduced by human factors such as: inexperi-
ence of the travelers; stress due to long travels; uncomfortable
acquisitions due to the luggage; dirty biometric traits; dirty
acquisition sensors; lack of feedback; lack of supervision by
an operator [3]. In this context, multimodal biometric systems
can perform more accurate and reliable biometric verifications
by taking advantage of the increase in information [4]. For this
reason, multimodal approaches are gaining acceptance in ABC
scenarios, with deployments in Spain, Italy, China, and Japan
[1].
Nonetheless, current multimodal ABC solutions are still
not standard, and generally use simple fusion strategies, such
as cascaded decision level processes that combine face and
fingerprint [5]. In fact, technological limitations reduce their
applicability since hardware and software modules in ABCs
can be produced by different providers, thus presenting differ-
ences in the captured images and biometric data. Moreover,
privacy limitations do not allow to disclose biometric data
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captured in ABC systems for training advanced biometric
fusion models [6].
To deal with these problems, this paper proposes a frame-
work for the biometric fusion in ABC systems, with the
features of being technology-neutral and privacy-compliant.
By performing an analysis of the multimodal fusion techniques
that can improve the recognition accuracy in ABC systems,
the most suitable techniques for ABC systems are determined
based on security, technological, and privacy requirements.
Currently, no public biometric database captured using ABCs
is available. To simulate real application scenarios, we col-
lected databases resembling the different conditions arising in
ABC scenarios, and we used commercial biometric recognition
software employed in ABC installations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes the
suitability of the most commonly used multimodal fusion tech-
niques for ABC scenarios. Section III presents the performed
experiments and obtained results. Section IV concludes the
work.
II. MULTIMODAL BIOMETRIC FUSION IN ABC SYSTEMS
A. Challenges in ABC scenarios
The main objective of the application of multimodal fusion
to ABC systems is to increase the border security while
facilitating the clearance process to the traveler. For this
reason, it is important to rely on well-established and robust
fusion techniques.
Privacy protection represents another important challenge
for the development of viable fusion methods for ABC sys-
tems. In some countries, the legal framework denies the pos-
sibility to store and disseminate biometric data obtained from
government systems [6], resulting in a design problem from
two perspectives. First, many advanced fusion techniques,
such as classifier-based techniques [4], require a preliminary
training to tune some of the parameters. In these cases, the
larger the amount of data similar to the data that can be
found in the operational environment, the more accurate the
obtained model will be. However, it is difficult to obtain large
quantities of biometric samples due to privacy limitations.
Hence, the obtained models could not perform as expected,
and it would be preferable to use techniques that only require
simple training or that can be trained using public datasets.
Second, the operational evaluation of the ABC system is
more complex than the procedure used in other application
scenarios, and the computation of typical figures of merit,
such as FAR, FRR or ROC curves is also more difficult. It
is therefore necessary to rely on evaluations carried out using
public datasets or with internal testing procedures [7]. An
alternative is to perform the analysis using a subset of the
transactions carried out by the ABC system that guarantees
privacy protection [6].
Moreover, ABC systems in many cases depend on hardware
and software modules implemented by different producers, and
may also need to include legacy systems. For this reason, it is
necessary to design technology-neutral techniques that do not
affect existing and proprietary biometric systems.
B. Analysis of state of the art techniques
Multimodal systems can mitigate important problems of
monomodal approaches, such as non-universality and high
intra-class variability [4], and are more robust against non-
ideal environments and spoofing attempts [8]. Traditionally,
multimodal systems have been divided in four levels, depend-
ing on the step of the biometric process at which the data
are fused: sensor level, feature level, score level, and decision
level [4]. This section analyzes which fusion techniques can
be easily adapted to current ABC scenarios to improve the
recognition performance, and which fusion methods are less
suitable.
Sensor level methods operate by concatenating the data ac-
quired using different sensors, which makes them technology-
dependent, less commonly used and, hence, they are consid-
ered not robust enough for ABCs. Feature level fusion meth-
ods, which combine the templates from each trait, represent a
more promising research line. However, their dependence on
the access to biometric templates, which in ABC scenarios are
generally not accessible to border operators, makes their cur-
rent application more difficult. Decision level techniques are
simpler and easier to implement. Nonetheless, their capability
to improve recognition performance is limited compared with
more advanced techniques.
For all the above reasons we have decided to focus on score
level techniques, which combine the matching scores obtained
from different matching methods. In an ABC context, these
fusion methods offer a technology-neutral approach, which can
favor the integration of the different modules of the biometric
recognition process. Score level methods have been used, for
instance, in the Spanish ABC systems to combine face and
fingerprint in a hierarchical way [5]. In the literature, many
score level methods have been proposed, however not all
of them are suitable for ABC scenarios. In particular, the
application of learning-based methods that require the training
of fusion models [9] is limited by privacy issues, since it is not
possible to use biometric data captured in ABCs for training
the models.
Nonetheless, there are techniques that can be easily applied
to ABCs and that, to the best of our knowledge, have not been
previously tested. These techniques include the well-known
methods such as sum, product, maximum score, minimum
score, and weighted sum. Several works have demonstrated
that the rule of the sum always helps in increasing the
recognition accuracy [10].
Usually, the works proposing classifier-based methods re-
quire a training phase, use the same database to train and
validate the technique, and only in some cases the tests are
performed using techniques such as cross validation, which
allows to avoid over-fitting and obtain realistic error estima-
tions. However, this kind of approach is not directly applicable
to ABC scenarios, because the possibility to store data needed
by this operation is not common in real ABCs. The likelihood
ratio technique [9] offers a good alternative in this sense,
since it is a mature technique that relies on a robust simple
model, Gaussian Mixture Models. In addition, it also permits
to exploit quality scores. For these reasons, we have decided to
use it in this work. Moreover, we designed a privacy-compliant
training procedure, by using different datasets for training and
test (including public datasets).
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Used datasets
To the best of our knowledge, no biometric database cap-
tured using ABC systems is publicly available. Moreover,
not all public databases “as it is” allow to correctly predict
the performance of biometric systems in ABCs. For these
reasons, we collected different datasets by considering bio-
metric samples extracted from public biometric databases,
simulating different conditions that can arise in ABC systems.
We considered face and fingerprint databases since they are
the most common biometric modalities used in ABC systems
[1]. All the images have been captured using acquisition
devices similar to the ones used in e-Gates, and in controlled
environments. In the case of face databases, we considered
both ICAO compliant (good quality) images and non-ICAO
compliant (medium-low quality) samples, to obtain a trade-off
between the quality of images stored in e-Passports and the
quality of live images captured at the e-Gate. In particular, we
considered the following databases:
• FEI Face Database [11], containing face images captured
using a color camera with a uniform background. We se-
lected 100 individuals, with 8 samples for each individual
captured in the same session, for a total of 800 images.
A subset of the images is ICAO compliant [12], thus
allowing to simulate e-Passport’s images, while the rest
of the images are more challenging. In particular, these
images present challenging aspects that may appear in
an ABC scenario, such as variations in the lighting or
changes in pose and expression, which can simulate the
possibility of a live acquisition at the e-Gate where the
person is not correctly following the acquisition protocol
[13]. Also, even if a uniform background is not always
present in real ABC systems, methods for face detection
and segmentation have been proved to work also with
unconstrained backgrounds in ABC scenarios [14], [15].
• AR Face Database [16], containing face images captured
using a color camera with a uniform background. We se-
lected 100 individuals, with 8 samples for each individual
captured in two sessions taken 14 days apart, for a total
of 800 images. Part of the database is ICAO compliant
[12], as images stored in e-Passports should be, whereas
other images present some challenges. In particular, this
database allows us to simulate other conditions of an e-
Gate, such as when the biometric samples stored in the
passport have been captured before the passage through
the e-Gate and differences in make-up or hairstyle can be
present during the border crossing.
• FVC (Fingerprint Verification Database) 2002 DB1 [17],
containing fingerprint samples captured using a medium-
quality, legacy optical sensor with a 13.2 × 25 mm
sensing area and with 500 ppi resolution. The database
is composed by 100 individuals, with 8 samples for
each individual, for a total of 800 images. This database
permits to simulate passports with samples captured with
old equipment.
• FVC (Fingerprint Verification Database) 2006 DB2 [18],
containing fingerprint samples captured using a more
recent medium-quality optical fingerprint acquisition sen-
sor, with 17.8×25mm sensing area and 500ppi resolution.
We selected 100 individuals, with 8 samples for each
individual, for a total of 800 images. Differently from
the FVC 2002 DB1 database, the volunteers included
also manual workers and elderly people. Moreover, the
acquisition procedure did not consider any constraint used
for increasing the quality of the captured samples. This
database allows to simulate people with all kinds of
ages, jobs, and familiarity with technology. Moreover,
the fingerprint images captured in non-ideal situations
simulate the possibility of people passing through the e-
Gate with fingers swollen, dirty, or greasy from the travel
[3].
Then, using the four databases, we created two scenarios:
Scenario 1, using FEI for face and FVC 2002 DB1 for
fingerprint; Scenario 2, using AR for face and FVC 2006 DB2
for fingerprint. Moreover, in order to recreate the operational
conditions of ABC systems, we applied the compression tech-
niques described by the ICAO for storing biometric samples in
e-Passports [12]. In particular, we used the WSQ compression
to produce fingerprint samples with ≈ 10 kB file size, and
the JPG compression to produce face images with ≈ 90 pixels
between the eyes and ≈ 15− 20 kB file size.
B. Experimental procedure
We used the biometric recognition softwares Cognitec Face-
VACS v9.1.1.0 and Dermalog Fingercode3 v1.2.1613.13 to
compute and match the templates from face and fingerprint
images, respectively. In both scenarios, we performed a sce-
nario evaluation [19] for all the fingerprint and face databases,
separately. For each database, the evaluation included 5600
genuine comparisons and 633600 impostor comparisons. We
considered as error metrics the EER and the FMR1000 (the
lowest FNMR for FMR ≤ 0.1%). Then, for each scenario, we
performed the score-level fusion using the sum, product, max,
min, weighted sum using Fisher’s rule [20], NCW rule [21],
MEW rule [22], OLD rule [22], likelihood ratio, and quality-
based likelihood ratio [9]. The training of the likelihood ratio
methods was performed on a random subset containing 50%
of genuine scores and 50% of the impostor scores, and tested
on the remaining scores. The procedure was repeated 10 times,
then the average FMR and FNMR were used to compute the
error metrics [9]. We tested the privacy-compliant biometric
fusion technique that can be applied in ABC systems by per-
forming the training and the test using two different datasets.
Moreover, a technology-neutral evaluation was performed by
considering biometric recognition algorithms produced by
different vendors.
C. Results of score-level fusion
The results for the Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are reported
in Table I. In both scenarios, it is possible to observe that
learning-based methods using the likelihood ratio obtained the
best results in terms of EER and the FMR1000, independently
from the used normalization technique. Moreover, Table I
shows that the sum rule allowed to obtain high accuracy in
terms EER and FMR1000, similar to the one obtained using
learning-based methods, but required a preliminary Z-Score
normalization to obtain the best results.
D. Privacy-compliant fusion for ABC systems
In order to test the accuracy of the privacy-compliant score-
level fusion, the scores obtained in Scenario 1 were used
to train the likelihood ratio fusion model, which was then
tested on the scores obtained in Scenario 2, and vice versa.
A preliminary Z-Score normalization was used. The results
are reported in Table II, showing that the recognition accuracy
was not significantly affected when the fusion model is trained
on different datasets, thus demonstrating that it is possible to
perform an off-line training of the fusion model in ABC even
with data captured in a different context (e.g. public datasets).
E. Technology-neutral evaluation
In this section we provide a technology-neutral evaluation
of the score-level fusion performance, by using the different
combinations of recognition algorithms from different vendors,
and analyzing the improvement in the EER and FMR1000 with
respect to using only the most accurate biometric trait (the
fingerprint). In particular, we used the software Dermalog Fin-
gercode3, Cognitec FaceVACS, Neurotechnology VeriFinger,
and Neurotechnology VeriLook. No previous normalizations
were performed, and the sum rule was used as fusion method
since it does not require any learning process. In all cases, it
increased the accuracy of the recognition [10]. For each com-
bination, we evaluated the differences ∆EER and ∆FMR1000
obtained by using the sum fusion strategy with respect to using
the fingerprint, which were computed as follows:
∆EER = EERsum − EERfinger ;
∆FMR1000 = FMR1000sum − FMR1000finger . (1)
TABLE I
SCORE-LEVEL FUSION RESULTS
Ref. Fusion
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Normalization method Normalization method
No norm. Min-max Z-Score No norm. Min-max Z-Score
EER FMR EER FMR EER FMR EER FMR EER FMR EER FMR1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
- Face 1.55 6.78 1.55 6.78 1.55 6.78 4.42 17.53 4.42 17.53 4.42 17.53
- Fingerprint 1.14 1.71 1.14 1.71 1.14 1.71 0.82 1.07 0.82 1.07 0.82 1.07
- Sum 1.00 1.60 0.17 0.42 0.09 0.07 0.64 1.07 0.28 0.60 0.21 0.21
- Product 0.32 0.64 0.28 0.53 0.47 0.64 1.25 2.42 1.10 2.10 0.21 0.21
- Max 1.14 1.71 0.45 6.75 0.21 0.39 0.82 1.07 0.57 1.46 0.37 0.75
- Min 1.55 6.78 0.99 4.60 1.00 1.75 4.42 17.53 2.35 4.35 2.21 4.75
Weighted sum
[20] Fisher 0.10 0.10 a 0.10 0.10 b 0.10 0.10 c 0.17 0.21 d 0.17 0.21 e 0.17 0.21 f
[21] NCW 0.10 0.10 g 0.10 0.10 h 0.10 0.10 i 0.17 0.21 j 0.17 0.21 k 0.17 0.21 l
[22] MEW 0.10 0.10 m 0.10 0.10 n 0.10 0.10 o 0.21 0.21 p 0.21 0.21 q 0.21 0.21 r
[22] OLD 0.42 0.60 s 0.42 0.60 t 0.42 0.60 u 0.57 0.89 x 0.56 0.89 y 0.56 0.89 z
[9] Likelihood ratio 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.20
[9] Quality-based 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10likelihood ratio
aw = (0.98, 0.02); bw = (0.36, 0.64); cw = (0.49, 0.51); dw = (0.95, 0.05); ew = (0.25, 0.75); fw = (0.31, 0.69)
gw = (0.28, 0.01); hw = (0.08, 0.21); iw = (0.11, 0.17); jw = (0.27, 0.01); kw = (0.07, 0.18); lw = (0.09, 0.16)
mw = (0.28, 0.01); nw = (0.09, 0.19); ow = (0.13, 0.15); pw = (0.28, 0.01); qw = (0.11, 0.16); rw = (0.14, 0.14)
sw = (0.26, 0.02); tw = (0.03, 0.26); uw = (0.04, 0.24); xw = (0.20, 0.08); yw = (0.01, 0.27); zw = (0.01, 0.26)
TABLE II
PRIVACY-COMPLIANT SCORE-LEVEL FUSION RESULTS USING THE
QUALITY-BASED LIKELIHOOD RATIO
Train scenario
Test scenario
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
EER FMR1000 EER FMR1000
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Scenario 1 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.18
Scenario 2 0.26 0.30 0.10 0.10
The results are summarized in Table III for both Scenario 1
and Scenario 2, showing that in all cases the fusion allowed to
obtain lesser or equal EER and FMR1000 with respect to using
only the most accurate biometric trait, independently of the
used recognition algorithm in the ABC context we simulated.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed an analysis of multimodal biomet-
ric fusion techniques for enhancing the recognition accuracy
in ABC scenarios. In particular, we selected two sets of
biometric databases with characteristics similar to the ones
that can be found in biometric samples captured in ABC
gates, or stored in e-Passports. After analyzing the challenges
and limitations present in ABC systems, we performed a
technology evaluation of the most commonly used score level
fusion techniques, showing that recent learning-based methods
such as the likelihood ratio obtain the best accuracy. Moreover,
we evaluated the performance of a privacy-compliant score-
level fusion using the likelihood ratio, demonstrating that
fusion methods can be used to enhance the performance of
ABC systems, even when actual data collected using ABC sys-
tems is not available. Lastly, a technology-neutral evaluation
proved that it is always possible to use score-level fusion to
increase the recognition accuracy in multimodal ABC systems,
independently of the used recognition algorithm. Future works
will consider new technological specifications for e-Passports
that may eventually be published, biometric databases captured
during the pilot testing of new ABC systems, and the fusion
of face and fingerprint with iris samples. Moreover, privacy-
compliant and technology-neutral aspects will be further ana-
lyzed.
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